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Abstract—The cloud computing paradigm emerged shortly 
after the introduction of the “invisible” grid concepts but it has 
taken only a few years for cloud computing to gain enormous 
momentum within industry and academia alike. However, 
providing adequate security support by those complex 
distributed systems is of primary importance for the wide 
adoption of cloud computing by the end users. This paper gives 
an overview of the main cloud security issues and challenges. 
Existing and proposed solutions are also presented with 
particular attention to the security as a service approach. Some 
of the available directions for future work are also discussed. 
Keywords-cloud computing; trust and security; security as a 
service; smart clouds 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the concepts and implementations of 
modern distributed computing infrastructures have been 
developing in the area of cloud computing. Subsequently, a 
new discipline rapidly emerged based on cloud computing’s 
layered architecture with accepted succinct definitions for 
the software-as-a-service (SaaS), platform-as-a-service 
(PaaS) and infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) layers [17]. 
However, in order to tackle further the security challenges at 
global scale we need qualitatively new high-end computing 
infrastructures with smart properties. The cloud computing 
paradigm is suitable for this purpose but it needs significant 
improvements to implement the best trade-off between the 
autonomy necessary to scale up, and the trust of the users. 
On the one hand, users must have the guarantee that their 
requirements, in terms of management of their applications 
and data, will always be satisfied. On the other hand, 
autonomic management of applications and data would give 
the infrastructure greater flexibility and would enable better 
security, performance, robustness, energy consumption, etc. 
While the basic cloud middleware tools and technologies 
such as virtualization, distributed storage, distributed 
execution, data and computation migration, service definition 
and implementation have reached industry-standard 
engineering level [14], cloud computing is not yet widely 
adopted. This may be for several reasons, but probably the 
most important one is related to security [5]. For example, 
many companies are subject to regulations concerning the 
way the data they own should be dealt with. This is 
particularly important when the cloud adoption implies the 
disclosure of private, sensitive, and/or valuable data to the 
cloud service provider (CSP). In such cases a company will 
wonder: Where will my data be stored? In which countries 
will the infrastructure be located? What are the security 
regulations in those countries? Is the data going to be stored 
in a single physical place or distributed across different sites? 
Are intermediate results of the computation 
secured/encrypted? More generally, do the data storage and 
computation comply with the requirements expressed by the 
user? 
Issues of the same nature also arise in more complex 
scenarios. In a number of significant cases, the application or 
the cloud service is inherently distributed. This typically 
happens in manufacturing and business domains, where 
different organizations interoperate and may to some extent 
share services or data. In these cases, the current tendency in 
addressing security and trust is to achieve security-by-
obscurity, i.e. either the user trusts the CSP or the user owns 
the cloud itself. In other words, attempts to gain the users' 
trust are aimed mainly at avoiding the issue by privatizing or 
embedding the data and services (e.g. private clouds), rather 
than solving it. 
A promising way to address the current security concerns 
and problems is based on making the quality of service 
(QoS) a first-class concept, which is managed as a contract, 
i.e. known by partners and independently verifiable. This can 
be achieved by designing and building smart clouds [4] via a 
full exploitation of the autonomic computing paradigm as a 
distributed set of mechanisms for monitoring and control, 
equipped with a distributed, diffused, and dynamic 
management overlay. Up to now, autonomic computing has 
been industrially developed only at a syntactic level as a 
method to express application-specific concepts. An 
important next phase is to develop a fully-fledged 
methodology, middleware services, and development tools 
able to support the QoS-scalable design of services in smart 
clouds.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II 
provides background overview information about the current 
status of security and interoperability in cloud computing. 
Section III presents four different categories of cloud 
security issues. Section IV describes the Security-as-a-
Service (SecaaS) and finally, Section V concludes the paper. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The concept of a hybrid cloud is an attractive one for 
many organisations, allowing an organisation with an 
existing private cloud to partner with a public cloud provider. 
This can be a valuable resource as it allows companies to 
keep some of their operation in-house, but benefit from the 
scalability and on-demand nature of the public cloud. There 
are, however, a number of issues that organisations must 
consider before opting for a hybrid cloud set-up.  
The single most pressing issue that must be addressed is 
that, by definition, the hybrid cloud is never ‘yours’ – part of 
it is owned or operated by a third party, which can lead to 
security concerns. With a true private cloud – hosted entirely 
on your own premises – the security concerns for an IT 
manager are no different to those associated with any other 
complex distributed system. However, when this private 
cloud is hosted by a third party, the security issues facing the 
customers become very complex and difficult to solve. 
Although this cloud is in theory, still private, the fact that it 
relies on external resources means that the users are no 
longer in control of their data. Security remains a major 
adoption concern, as many CSPs put the burden of cloud 
security on the customer, leading some to explore costly 
ideas like third party insurance.  
It is a huge risk, as well as impractical, to insure the very 
expensive company data – potential losses from losing major 
trading or logistical applications are enormous. CSPs should 
offer greater assurance to reduce the idea that insurance is 
even needed. Another issue that organisations must consider 
is interoperability – internal and external systems must work 
together before security issues can be considered.  
It could be said, therefore, that a true hybrid cloud is 
actually quite difficult to achieve, when interoperability and 
security issues are considered. One solution might be a 
regulatory framework that would allow cloud subscribers to 
undergo a risk assessment prior to data migration, helping to 
make service CSPs accountable and provide transparency 
and assurance.  
Concerns with hybrid cloud are indicative of the anxiety 
that many companies feel when considering cloud computing 
as a viable business option. We need to see a global 
consensus on regulation and standards to increase trust and 
security in this technology and lower the risks that many 
organisations feel go hand-in-hand with entrusting key data 
or processing capabilities to third parties. Once this hurdle is 
removed then the true benefits of cloud computing can 
finally be realised.  
III. SECURITY ISSUES IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
Generally speaking, there are several categories of 
security attacks in a cloud. This section considers the most 
important ones.  
A. Infrastructure Security 
The analysis of infrastructure security can be split into 
three layers – network, host and application. In the case of a 
private cloud, there is no difference between the previous IT 
infrastructure and the cloud solution. The old security 
measures can be kept in place and there are no risks of 
malicious insiders. Consequently, there are no new threats to 
the infrastructure security. Therefore, the following 
discussion is concerned only with the public and hybrid 
deployment models. 
1) Network security 
This is valid both for the physical network on which the 
cloud runs and the virtual network which is created by the 
virtual instances running in the cloud. There are three aspects 
which can be separated [7]: 
a) Securing data in transit (to and from the public 
cloud). This could be done by setting up a VPN at least for 
the physical network, but the most common approach is to 
use HTTPS, thus implementing strictly in the browser as a 
thin client. 
b) Managing access control (authentication, 
authorization, auditing). The physical part of the network 
can be protected in the same way as before – using firewalls 
and IDS solutions. However, the management of the access 
control is different on the virtual part. Network zones 
disappear, so a virtual separation has to be envisioned. This 
is done using domains and rules are enforced by application 
(virtual) firewalls.  
c) Availability. The network faces the same threats 
regarding its availability: routing protocol tampering (such 
as BGP prefix hijacking), DNS poisoning, DNS forgery or 
the infamous denial of service (DoS). In the context of the 
cloud, the attack can also originate internally.  
2) Host security  
Securing the hosts supporting the cloud requires the same 
operations as with protecting an enterprise IT infrastructure. 
The process of OS hardening should be strengthened and 
should only allow the processes that support the operation of 
the cloud. In this context the security of the hypervisor 
comes into play. The chosen virtualization tools should be 
the trusted ones, with as few successful attacks as possible in 
their background. Even these solutions have weaknesses 
which make them susceptible to attacks, but with time they 
are expected to mature enough to be considered secure.  
Regarding the virtual aspects, security provisioning 
depends on the chosen type of service. At the IaaS layer, the 
customer is responsible for security measures. Hosts should 
be protected as if they were operating in an untrusted 
network using software firewalls, antiviruses OS hardening, 
etc. Furthermore, the virtual hosts should be patched and 
maintained in a way similar to the physical resources. 
However, these virtual hosts are incomparably more 
dynamic than the physical ones. It should be understood that 
the only feasible way to scale the infrastructure to hundreds 
and thousands of running virtual machines (VMs), is to 
employ the use of templates. If any security flaws slip in 
here, the whole cloud network using the weak template is 
vulnerable to a quickly expanding attack.  
At the PaaS later, the CSPs usually offer a set of APIs for 
interaction with the host abstraction layer which developers 
cannot avoid – their security is in the hands of the provider. 
However, applications developed here should consider the 
Internet-threat model. Aside from this, there is no control 
that the customer has over security. In the case of SaaS, the 
user totally relies on the CSP.  
3) Application security  
Until now, it has been a common practice to secure 
applications using perimeter security controls and access 
management. In the case of a public cloud, applications face 
higher risks than the applications running on a private cloud 
or on a traditional IT infrastructure. The new family of 
applications are based on the browser and rely on net-centric 
technologies. Developing these applications should take into 
consideration the common threats regarding web 
applications such as OWASP’s Top 10 [10]. Of particular 
importance is the browser used to run the application. As all 
applications basically are run by the browser and not by the 
host’s OS, it is of no surprise that the browser can be seen as 
an OS for cloud applications. Therefore, the security policy 
should cover browser maintenance as well.  
A very powerful attack that can be employed at this level 
is the application DoS attack. Such attacks often originate 
from infected hosts as it is the case with network DoS. The 
DoS attack is a real threat in a cloud because of the real 
potential to access virtually unlimited resources. These 
attacks can range from repeatedly refreshing web pages to 
loading the applications with specific tasks or protocol-
specific requests supported by the cloud service.  
A unique type of attack is the economic denial of 
sustainability (EDoS) [7]. This type of attack is directly 
connected with a DoS attack, but its target is to inflate the 
cloud services budget. Because of the pay-per-use business 
model, a lengthy application DoS attack has financial 
implications as well.  
B. Data Security  
Data security tries to ensure data confidentiality or 
privacy and integrity of data and to allow audit operations to 
be carried on it. There are three relevant aspects for this.  
1) Data encryption (confidentiality)  
The infrastructure security should prevent unauthorized 
access to data. Following a layered security approach, the 
next protective mechanism should assume that the 
infrastructure security mechanisms have failed – and try to 
prevent or control data loss or damage.  
Encryption might be the obvious next choice, but the 
current encryption techniques are only functional for data at 
rest and data in transit (to and from the CSP). It is not 
possible to perform operations on encrypted data – aside 
from simple sum and some products. Therefore, dynamic 
data such as data used at SaaS or PaaS layers and non-
storage IaaS services remains unencrypted [7] in order to 
support operations like indexing, searching or mathematical 
calculations. There is current work in progress on the next 
generation technology called homomorphic encryption. This 
technique will allow operations on encrypted data – but is 
very computing-intensive [11] and opens up a number of 
new problems such as development, debugging, and 
validation of software working with encrypted data.  
Considering these, the current conclusion is that sensitive 
data should not be moved to a public cloud, unless it’s for 
Storage-as-a-Service and is encrypted. Even in this case, 
recent surveys [12] show that there still is a major concern 
among security professionals regarding encryption in the 
cloud. Therefore the following should be considered when 
opting for an encryption system in the cloud:  
• The CSP stores metadata which describes what 
clients store in their system. This metadata should 
also be protected through at least some type of 
access mechanisms, if not possible to encrypt. In the 
case of encrypting this metadata, there is also the 
problem of key management in the cloud which is 
generally several orders of magnitude larger than an 
enterprise key management system [7].  
• The most secure cloud encryption environment 
(considering it runs in the cloud) is to separate the 
three components involved in the encryption process 
– key, algorithm and data [8]. In this way, even if 
one of them is compromised, the attacker still needs 
to compromise the other two. This offers time to 
secure the data – provided the first attack was 
observed.  
2) Data integrity and retrievability  
In the case of Storage-as-a-Service – e.g. storing 
encrypted data in a public cloud – aside from confidentiality, 
it is also important to implement an integrity mechanism that 
confirms that no one tampered with the data. This is usually 
a mechanism which is implemented together with the 
encryption – for example, digital signatures. 
It could be relevant for a customer to verify that the CSP 
still has their data intact. If the CSP experienced a situation 
which led to client data loss – such as corrupted or deleted 
data – the integrity check alone could not reveal the problem. 
Furthermore, because of the pay-per-use model, it should be 
avoided to retrieve the data from the CSP just to perform this 
check.  
There are some mechanisms called data retrievability 
that have been developed to allow the customer to confirm 
whether their data is still intact in the cloud [16]. From this, 
the mechanism was extended to allow stored data 
manipulation such as block deletion and insertion without 
the need to download a local copy [15].  
3) Data lineage and provenance  
In addition to protecting data, security also ensures that 
audit procedures can be operated. These procedures serve not 
only for forensic evidence in case of an attack, but can also 
help the customer to better understand how their data is 
being manipulated in the cloud – so that appropriate security 
measures are employed.  
In such a dynamic environment as the cloud, it is 
desirable to keep track of the data lineage – e.g. where each 
particular piece of data was at any given moment of time. As 
the cloud infrastructure operates with virtual devices, this 
lineage tracking can be extended to virtual instances as well.  
Because of the high dynamism in the cloud, it is very 
difficult to collect extensive information on data lineage such 
as the state of the systems dealing with each data piece. In 
fact, it is likely that the only information collected is limited 
to: IP addresses, country in which that specific host resides, 
host name, host domain and time stamp. Nonetheless, this 
information alone is relevant and important in many cases.  
In some applications it might also be relevant to consider 
data provenance. This information describes where and when 
data originated which is the first entry in the list of data 
lineage. If there is enough information describing where the 
information originated, the data can be considered as valid 
[7]. A relevant example is an application that operates with 
currencies in which case the exchange rate should originate 
from a trustworthy source.  
4) Data remanence  
Data remanence is not specific to cloud computing. 
Strong security policies cover the aspect of how data is 
eliminated from the physical media at the end of its life 
cycle. In the case of a private cloud, there are no new 
mechanisms which should be employed for this aspect.  
In the case of a public cloud, it is important to note that 
the customer does not have access to the physical storage 
devices. Therefore, the client cannot control how these 
devices are disposed of or reused. The only protection in this 
case is a strict contract or SLA which stipulates how this 
process is to be implemented by the CSP.  
There are currently no standards on how this operation 
should be performed. There are however guidelines from 
NIST which describe how data sanitization – e.g. removing 
the data from the media before reusing the media in an 
untrusted environment – should be performed [6]. Even if it 
is only intended for federal civilian departments and 
agencies, the document can be used as a starting point in 
formulating the contractual terms. 
5) Backup  
Even though this does not contribute to preventing 
unauthorized access to data, it is relevant to discuss the 
backup processes. One of the reasons to store data in the 
cloud is its capacity to survive in the case of an accident such 
as deletion or disaster such as fire or flooding.  
As with data remanence, a private cloud should not 
change backup plans already in place in a system where 
redundancy was considered. In the case of a public cloud, the 
subject is again out of the customer’s reach. Therefore, this 
aspect should also be included in the service contract.  
C. Identity, Authentication, Authorization and Auditing 
(IAAA) Management  
A rather important part of security provisioning is the 
management of who (authentication) can access the secured 
cloud service and what can that person do (authorization). 
Aside from this minimum, there are two other desired 
functions:  
• having a more complex system which can rule out 
duplicated accounts and which could link accounts 
for different applications, belonging to the same 
person (identity management); 
• for compliance and performance reasons, auditing 
the whole process.  
All these four processes form the IAAA management of 
cloud services. When discussing IAAA, there are two 
orthogonal factors which should be considered in order to 
determine the appropriate solution: the size and capabilities 
of the customer, giving the complexity of the IAAA 
mechanisms, and the cloud service utilised, giving the threats 
for the IAAA system.  
1) Customer  
The IAAA needs vary considerably based on the type of 
the customer. In the case of an individual consumer, their 
needs will usually be met by a simple “username and 
password” type of authorization and a Single Sign On (SSO) 
in services used.  
In the case of an enterprise, the problem is more 
complex. First of all, there is the problem of the modified 
trust boundary. In the traditional model, the trust boundary 
encompasses the network, systems and applications hosted in 
the local trusted IT infrastructure. With cloud computing, the 
trust boundary extends to include the CSP’s domain – and 
the customer does not have control over the IAAA 
mechanism provided in this domain.  
Furthermore, as opposed to the traditional model where 
the infrastructure was trusted, in the case of cloud computing 
the threat model changes: IAAA mechanisms have to operate 
in an untrusted environment. This has deep implications in 
all four IAAA components [2]:  
a) Identity – The number of user identities managed in 
a cloud might go from 50.000 in the case of an enterprise to 
millions as users no longer access a few local systems, but 
potentially many distributed systems. 
b) Authentication – The process should be more 
complex lowering the risk of unauthorized access, 
implementing standard-based solutions and opting for multi-
factor (usually two) authentication. Aside from username 
and password, in this case the authentication process should 
be validated by something unique for the user such as a 
smart card, or a token, or the person’s location. The device 
used for authentication should provide strong confirmation 
of who the person using, for example, biometrics or 
somebody who the person knows – another person who can 
verify the idedentity of the user.  
c) Authorization – Depending on the cloud service type 
(*aaS), the threat model must consider the shared 
characteristic of the environment – e.g. all users have access 
to the same application, platform or infrastructure. For 
example, data contained in a shared application should only 
be accessed by the desired users and the APIs used should 
each carry an authorization mechanism to block 
unauthorized access. 
d) Auditing – Special care has to be taken in order to 
maintain the trustworthiness of the reports obtained in audit 
procedures. Furthermore, the customer does not have access 
to the auditing process that the CSP has in place – leaving 
some possible openings in the system, which should be 
covered by contractual terms and SLAs.  
2) Cloud services  
a) SaaS – The authorization system must be much finer 
– users must be allowed access to only a part of the 
application, while most of the responsibilities are on CSP’s 
side. 
b) PaaS – In addition to SaaS, there are more possible 
roles with a whole new family of customers – the 
developers. Furthermore, as the cloud is usually regarded as 
an untrusted environment (particularly in the case of a 
public solution) and as developed applications could span 
multiple clouds, messages exchanged by APIs or new 
applications should be individually protected.  
c) IaaS – The infrastructure IAAA mechanisms that 
are in place for a traditional (physical) solution no longer 
apply in the virtual world. The security mechanisms move 
to application-level security provisioning. Given the size of 
the users’ base that a cloud solution has and the tendency to 
operate in multiple clouds, it is important to implement 
mechanisms which:  
• avoid duplication of identity, attributes and 
credentials; 
• allow automatic user management for customers; 
• allow SSO without disclosing credentials. 
In the end, both parties – the user and the CSP – have to 
understand that they play an important part in the IAAA 
mechanism. The CSP is expected to implement state-of-the 
art, standard-compliant solutions and allow interoperability 
with other clouds including SSO; the user must secure access 
for its part of the stack and enforce policies. As this step of 
security provisioning in the cloud is rather complex and 
requires continuous management from the user, there is an 
emerging trend to move everything that has to do with IAAA 
mechanisms in the cloud as a specialised service called 
Identity as a Service or IDaaS. 
D. Nefarious Usage of Cloud Computing  
In a highly secure cloud environment, with unbreakable 
infrastructure and data security and with strong IAAA 
mechanisms, there is still the risk of somebody harnessing 
the power of a cloud system in order to perform attacks. 
Such an attacking cloud is called a dark cloud [7]. The 
attacking cloud could be a private one, but surprisingly it 
could also be part of a public one, as the cost-effectiveness is 
attractive to attackers as well.  
A dark cloud could serve as the launching ground for 
very computing-intensive attacks. A cloud can also be used 
for creating dynamic attack sources, hosting malicious data 
or operating botnets. Furthermore, a cloud can also serve to 
launching DDoS attacks [3]. In the case of the computing-
intensive attacks, there is virtually no protection that can be 
envisioned. Without continuously monitoring the actions that 
a customer performs which is almost always against privacy 
agreements, a CSP cannot tell what the computations are 
used for. The only solution is to create even more complex 
protection mechanisms such as longer encryption keys, 
stronger encryption algorithms and passwords.  
Regarding the storage of malicious data or coordinating 
attacks from the cloud, there is very little that can be done 
without breaking privacy agreements and spying on the data 
stored by the customer. In the case of a private cloud, there is 
literally no tool to prevent this from happening.  
The case of DDoS attacks requires a closer look. If the 
target is not a cloud system, but a traditional IT 
infrastructure, then it can easily be denied its service. If the 
target is also residing in the cloud, then the consequences of 
a DDoS attack depend on the severity of the attack. A severe 
attack can also deplete the target’s cloud resources and lead 
to a denied of service state, whereas a less severe one can 
lead to excessive billing – EDoS. This can also be the ground 
for a blackmailing case.  
Defending against a DoS attack is not an easy task. There 
are two main approaches which could be envisioned:  
1) Protecting in the originating cloud (if the cloud is 
public). This could be accomplished by installing 
application IDS systems and monitoring the hosts of each 
client, but the level of resources required is so large, that 
this is not usually taking place.  
2) Protecting in the target’s cloud. The customer can 
opt for security services that include DDoS prevention. 
Solutions usually employ the approach of application IDS 
systems – a tried and tested approach with the traditional IT 
infrastructure. There is continuous work in improving the 
algorithms which protect against this type of attack as it is 
very likely in the cloud era.  
IV. MOVING SECURITY TO THE CLOUD: SECURITY-AS-A-
SERVICE 
A relatively new approach to security is based on the 
Security-as-a-Service (SecaaS) concepts [13]. As discussed 
above, securing a cloud system is a complex and time 
consuming task. Some companies opted to outsource this 
process and the market experienced a necessity for such 
security services. The answer was the appearance of 
managed security services (MSSs). A MSS provider (MSSP) 
assigns security personnel to its clients to administer the 
security mechanisms (generally, related to cloud services), 
using a pay-per-use model. With this, the customer is in 
charge of the security policies and it is his responsibility to 
monitor the efficiency of the services provided by the MSSP.  
As the client pool increased, MSSPs considered ways to 
centralize the service, in order to simplify and improve their 
results – hence the idea of security provisioning from the 
cloud. But MSS is not the only factor that leads to the 
development of the SECaaS. Companies that did not 
outsource the security provisioning and individual cloud 
users were still an attractive target and opportunity for cloud 
security services.  
Regardless of the target customer, moving cloud security 
into the cloud itself does have a strong advantage – it can, as 
well, harness the power of the cloud. Furthermore, due to the 
proliferation of endpoints and their dynamicity, it is 
attractive to protect the endpoints from within the cloud. A 
second benefit for this approach is a unified view over the 
threats, which can lead to better response times in the case of 
a new type of attack. However, SecaaS cannot achieve 
complete cloud security provisioning – there are still security 
measures which must be taken locally by each customer or 
their MSSP [9]. As observed in [7], there are four security 
mechanisms that could be provided from the cloud:  
A. Email Filtering 
Email was the first type of SaaS moved to the cloud. 
Protecting the email service from where it resides (and not 
from each endpoint) was regarded as normal – so this was 
also the first type of cloud SecaaS. This type of protection 
can employ multiple engines to scan for malware, spam and 
phishing threats carried in emails. Furthermore, eliminating 
these threats in the cloud reduces the bandwidth used with 
email, the load on the customer’s email servers and helps 
client’s existing anti-malware solutions if there are any.  
B. Web Content Filtering 
Having traffic routed through proxy servers of SecaaS 
providers allows for cleaning of web traffic while keeping 
the delay to a minimum. The capabilities for this type of 
service are quite advanced, from general URL filtering, 
HTTP header information screening, analysis of page 
content and embedded links to an advanced reputation 
system that is continuously being updated by users’ traffic. 
Additionally, it could also involve monitoring of the 
outgoing traffic in order to block possible information 
leaking, such as IDs, credit card information or intellectual 
property.  
C. Vulnerability Management 
This represents the evolution of MSS. In an effort to 
alleviate the problems related to vulnerable VMs due to the 
shared environment, client vulnerabilities are managed from 
the cloud through the use of complex systems such as 
application firewalls (e.g. between VMs), virtual IDSs, cloud 
antivirus and VPNs over VMs. A recent study revealed that 
CloudAV (a cloud antivirus solution) obtained a 35% 
improvement over endpoint-residing antivirus solutions. The 
centralization of vulnerability management activities could 
enable interoperation of increasingly complex security 
measures.  
D. Identity-as-a-Service (IDaaS) 
The identity management can be moved into the cloud 
too with simple adjustments to existing enterprise 
architectures. Such a move promises to be beneficial for 
customers because there is a centralized point from where 
identification requests are managed. This ensures standard 
compliance, interoperability in federations (using SSO) and 
removes the complexity of IAAA mechanisms from 
customers’ management.  
The SecaaS technology is still evolving – with multiple 
approaches. Some providers offer solutions that require 
traffic to be directed through their systems, whereas others 
offer specialised SaaS solutions which can be installed over 
the services that are already in use from other CSPs.  
Currently, SecaaS providers come from two 
backgrounds: they are either new entrants specializing in 
niche zones and proposing novel solutions, or well-
established anti-malware companies which extend their 
services in the cloud world. With time, the trust relationship 
between customers and CSPs on the one side and the SecaaS 
providers on the other side is expected to improve. This will 
lead to a proliferation of this type of services and a better 
penetration of these solutions. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Over the next decade, CSPs may expand the types of 
services delivered; new component technologies may create 
shifts in platform standardization, commoditization, and 
differentiation; and cloud adopters may gravitate to specific 
providers for certain workloads depending also on the prices. 
In each of these cases however, trusted security solutions and 
services are going to play primary role towards the wider 
adoptions in this fundamental paradigm shift in computing 
and data storage services.  
In this paper we argue that substantial improvements in 
cloud security can be achieved by adopting the autonomic 
computing approach for developing and building smart cloud 
systems.  
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